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Neighbourhood Effects on Jihadist Radicalisation 
in Germany? Some Case-Based Remarks
Jörg Hüttermann, The Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence (IKG),
Bielefeld University, Germany
About twenty young people travelled from a small German former mining settlement named Dinslaken-Lohberg to become
fighters with al-Nusra and ISIS. They drew particular attention, with media reports about “members” of what they termed the
“Lohberg Brigade” killed in the fighting, or in air strikes by the anti-ISIS coalition, or in spectacular suicide attacks claiming
many victims. Drawing on that case, the article explores how neighborhood can effect the emergence and persistence of radi -
calisation to jihadi neo-Salafism. The author presents a series of local elements that interfere with one another to strengthen
each other’s persistence and effects and thus promote the emergence and persistence of the radicalisation phenomenon at
hand. The interference of elements is not an automatic but a social process, enacted by neighbors telling stories of conspiracy,
of discrimination and recounting experiences of spirituality, heroism, masculinity, and femaleness. It is performed by neighbors
setting, crossing and avoiding symbolic boundaries. And finally it is played by neighbors simply following their routines. The au-
thor shows how explaining space-related radicalisation processes means more than adding up spatial factors. His approach re-
jects the idea of isolating a single social fact – such as local structures, events, processes or social actors that existed, oc -
curred or acted prior to the emergence of radicals in their neighbourhood – as definite cause for radicalisation.
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1. Radicalisation in the Neighbourhood
Between 2014 and 2016 several hundred jihadists left Ger-
many to fight in Syria or Iraq with the al-Qaeda offshoot al-
Nusra Front or the so-called Islamic State. The discovery that
about twenty young people had departed from just one small
former mining town named Dinslaken-Lohberg drew particu-
lar attention, with media reports about “members” of what
they termed the “Lohberg Brigade” killed in the fighting, or in
air strikes by the anti-ISIS coalition, or in spectacular suicide
attacks claiming many victims. Witness reports and other evi-
dence suggest that young men from Lohberg participated in
torture and executions, while the appearance of Lohberg ji-
hadists in Islamist propaganda videos generated public un-
ease. After  part  of the group returned to Germany to face
prosecution, the media also showed great interest in their tri-
als, verdicts and sentences. Especially following the Paris at-
tacks  in  2017, the  question  was  how  and  why  so  many
young men (and a number of women) from a settlement with
just six thousand inhabitants on the outskirts of an incon-
spicuous German town could turn into jihadists. Are certain
urban neighbourhoods in Germany serving as socio-spatial
hotbed for  neo-Salafist  radicalisation, in the same way as
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean  in  Brussels  or  the  banlieus  outside
Paris?
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At first  glance the answer would appear to be no. For a
start, with a population of six thousand Lohberg is very much
smaller  than  Molenbeek  (almost  one  hundred  thousand).
And Dinslaken-Lohberg is a small town, whereas in Belgium
and France we are dealing with metropolitan settings, as well
as very different histories of relations between majority and
minority  society  and different  national  integration  models.
Another difference is that Germany – unlike France in partic-
ular – has never witnessed the kind of large-scale civil unrest
among migrant youth upon which Salafist radicalisation pro-
cesses could piggyback; this speaks against fears that we
could be seeing the emergence of “French or Belgian condi-
tions” (Loch 2009; also Castel 2009; Moran 2011).
Identifying  a  few  obvious  differences  is  naturally  not
enough to provide a proper answer to the questions posed
above; we must dig deeper. This is a question for urban so-
cial ecology, which in the century since its founding has ac-
cumulated a mass of empirical knowledge about the ways in
which socio-spatial and neighbourhood effects can affect the
actions, attitudes, experiences and biographies of the inhabi-
tants of urban spaces, for example in relation to experiences
of discrimination, educational ambition, health, deviancy, so-
cial  mobility,  intergenerational  poverty  (Sampson  2012;
Massey 2013; van Ham et al. 2012) or intergroup contact
(Schönwälder et al. 2016, 9). Yet to this day we still know too
little about exactly how such effects function, including which
local mechanisms, peculiarities, side-effects, amplifiers and
feedback loops interact and how (Sampson 2012, 64–47;
exceptions include Schönwälder et al. 2016, 97–171; Hüt-
termann 2018; Hüttermann and Minas 2015). The fact that
the latest research on neighbourhood effects brings together
disciplines like psychology, medicine and sociology to illumi-
nate effects  and the processes that  enable  them demon-
strates  a  belief  that  such  effects  derive  from  a  complex
causal milieu (Massey 2004).
However it still remains largely unclear whether social-eco-
logical and socio-spatial models possess explanatory advan-
tages over widely studied socio-structural variables such as
education and income, and which these might be (van Ham
et al. 2012, 3). The question of whether evidence exists for
neighbourhood effects and how they arise has to be asked
and answered anew for each new question of interest: from
unwanted teenage pregnancies to diverse manifestations of
violence. And so it is for the phenomenon of radicalisation of
young Muslim men and women in urban contexts  in  Ger-
many. Those are the starting points for the following case-
based reconstructive analysis. The author will definitely not
be supplying a definitive clarification of the relationships be-
tween place and radicalisation to a jihadi version of  neo-
Salafism; case-based arguments are generally unsuited for
such purposes. But he would like to highlight that place does
matter for understanding the emergence and persistence of
radicalisation towards jihadist neo-Salafism as witnessed in
Dinslaken-Lohberg. 
2. Theoretical and Methodological Approach
Understanding the way space matters in the present context
requires us to renounce traditional deterministic approaches
of cause and consequence. Instead of seeking causal expla-
nations we need to think in terms of a) the emergence of a
social phenomenon (Wahlberg 2014; Luhmann 1997, 134–
44) and b) the functional explanation of its persistence (Hüt-
termann 2003). With a view to our theme, this means that
the interference of local spatial structures, local spatial pro-
cesses  and local  events  and their  relationship  to  societal
and transnational contexts constitutes a milieu of social ele-
ments that  as a whole increases the probability  of neigh-
bourhoods (like Lohberg) experiencing radicalisation towards
jihadist neo-Salafism. The focus of this epistemological ap-
proach lies in interference, emergence, and persistence, but
not in causation in the classical sense. As a consequence,
neighbourhood-related  radicalisation  towards  jihadist  neo-
Salafism should be seen as different from the underlying in-
terfering elements that broadly constitute an emergence-pro-
moting milieu. This approach rejects mechanical understand-
ings social phenomena. It  is also far from suggesting that
there is only one path to radicalisation towards jihadist neo-
Salafism, and thus corresponds to the standard set by Randy
Borum (2011a). This  understanding ultimately  prevents us
from treating single social facts – such as local structures,
events, processes or social actors that existed, occurred or
acted prior to the emergence of radicals in their neighbour-
hood – as definite causes for radicalisation. In fact, the phe-
nomenon of  radicalisation goes far  beyond –  and departs
from – its preconditions.
In the following the author presents a series of local ele-
ments  that  interfere  with  one  another,  strengthen  each
other’s persistence and effects, and thus promote the advent
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and persistence of the emergence-promoting milieu. The in-
terference of local elements is not an automatic but a social
process. It  is  enacted by  neighbours  . It  is  performed by
neighbours setting, crossing and avoiding symbolic bound-
aries (Lamont and Molnár 2002). And finally it is played out
by neighbours simply following their routines. 
The first local element of interest is the peculiar moral or-
der  that  characterises  neighbourhood life  in  Dinslaken-Lo-
hberg. Core features are (a) self-perception as outsiders and
(b) suppression of any intent to conduct intergroup conflicts
in public. The sociogenesis of the local moral order reaches
back into Lohberg’s history as a coal mining settlement (see
section 3., which supplies an introductory description of the
area). The subsequent sections introduce other elements of
the emergence-promoting milieu: the local youth culture, the
combative  everyday  culture, the  ethos of  the  warrior, and
concepts of spiritual salvation, which are reinforced by the
peculiar moral order of the neighbourhood. These elements
in turn, strengthen and interfere with other elements to sta-
bilise and even reinforce the local moral order. And if  that
were not enough, strengthening any single element seems to
strengthen every single other element. A space-related milieu
of emergence is thus constituted. This is the core idea of an
emergence-promoting milieu that allows and assists things
to happen and persist.  The fact that an in extenso descrip-
tion of the complex interaction of all these elements would
lead us beyond the scope of this or of any other single article
does not prevent the author from gathering the most relevant
elements of the causal milieu in the following sections. He
believes that further research on space-related radicalisation
processes might benefit from the underlying milieu-led epis-
temological approach. 
Before turning to the case at hand, some core concepts
should be addressed: radicalisation, neo-Salafism and life-
world boundary regime. 
The author understands radicalisation as a process of in-
teraction in which social actors (not exclusively individuals)
perceive themselves as being involved in a social conflict in
the course of which they develop a readiness to apply de-
viant means for settling the conflict in their interest. Powerful
social elites define which means are deviant. This definition
seems to be at least compatible with the state of the art of
relational radicalisation research (Borum 2011a, 2011b).  It
also  encompasses  the  French  controversy  between  those
who explain jihadi violence as an outcome of the radicalisa-
tion of Islam (Gilles Keppel) and those who see it as a result
of  an  Islamisation  of  radicalness  (Olivier  Roy)  (Dziri  and
Kiefer 2017). 
The concept  of  neo-Salafism underlying this article goes
back to  an accumulative  definition  recently  elaborated by
Rauf Ceylan (2017, 17–22). Ceylan enumerates thirty ele-
ments distinguishing neo-Salafism from other forms of Sunni
Islam, the most important being: (a) youth movement char-
acter, (b) lay culture, (c) major role of lay preachers, (d) ele-
ments of legalistic/literalistic and charismatic fundamental-
ism, (e) missionary zeal, and (f) anti-Shia, anti-mystic and
anti-Semitic  orientation. The jihadi  version of  neo-Salafism
also involves characteristics like martyrdom and f violence as
a form of worship (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208 ff.).
In order to reconstruct intergroup relations in Dinslaken-Lo-
hberg, the author makes use of the concept of the “lifeworld
boundary regime”, which includes the ensemble of symbolic
boundaries embedded in the daily life of a neighbourhood.
The author has already used this concept in various ethno-
graphic studies on the development of intergroup relations
(Hüttermann 2018). The concept builds on the observation
that residents are embedded in daily routines. They do not
usually experience administrative boundaries, but construct,
observe and/or cross symbolic boundaries. The peculiar tex-
ture of symbolic boundaries consists of symbols, incorpora-
tion rituals, lifestyles, and/or atmospheres. If  an ethnogra-
pher crosses such lines, as described in the following, he is
able to explore their permeability. If he undergoes local rites
des passage while approaching a group or organisation he
will experience obstacles and resistance. This permits the re-
construction of intergroup hierarchies and transitions. Recon-
structing the experiences of many residents navigating the lo-
cal space, allows the researcher to trace the ensemble that
constitutes the lifeworld boundary regime of the neighbour-
hood. 
Finally some remarks on the data upon which this article is
based: The study draws heavily on eight qualitative interviews
with local experts (teachers, social workers, businesspeople,
etc.) and fourteen narrative-biographical interviews with ado-
lescents and young adults, about half of whom sympathised
at least temporarily with Isis and/or al-Nusra. Some were rel-
atives  of  those who joined al-Nusraa in  Syria  and Iraq. A
great  deal of  data was generated via participant  observa-
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tions in a local martial arts club whose members were pre-
dominantly of Turkish origin. The observations lasted eighteen
months (almost every weekend). Unlike the renowned Loïc
Wacquant, the  author  of  the  present  contribution  thought
better of participating in the sports club activities. Instead he
sat or stood on the sidelines and chatted with members and
visitors. He benefited from the circumstance that almost ev-
ery young Muslim he encountered regarded him as a kind of
“secret service man”. This image seemed possess a certain
attraction even for those young people who sympathised with
ISIS: they simply had a strong wish to be seen.
3. Lohberg: Settlement Type and Local Moral Order
Dinslaken and its 67,452 residents (2011 census) are lo-
cated geographically on the right bank of the Rhine on the
northern margins of the Ruhr region. The municipal  Social
Report (Sozialbericht) from 2013 describes Dinslaken as a
“medium-sized municipality with weak development trends”
(Mrosek and Berger 2013, 16),  attributable to the decline of
the steel industry and the closure in 2005 of the Lohberg
coal mine. Population forecasts in the same document pre-
dict  a  declining  and ageing  population, with  tax  revenues
falling  more sharply  than can be compensated by budget
cuts.
And the situation in Lohberg itself? If one compares the
former  mining  community  of  Lohberg  (2012:  5,821  resi-
dents) with the town of Dinslaken (about 67,000), a number
of features stand out: Lohberg is comparatively densely pop-
ulated  (3,900  residents/km2  against  1,450/km2  for  the
municipality as a whole). In Lohberg 21 percent of house-
holds receive means-tested benefits, across the town as a
whole just 8 percent. Aggregating benefit types, 22.3 percent
of Lohberg residents depended on some kind of state trans-
fer payments in the period covered by the 2013 Social Re-
port  (in the middle-class district  of Dinslaken-Eppinghoven
the figure was just 3 percent.) A comparatively small propor-
tion of Lohberg’s population is formally employed and about
40 percent  of  its  unemployed  are  non-German  nationals.
During the same period youth unemployment in Lohberg (13
percent of twenty- to twenty-five-year-olds) was higher than
in the town overall. Lohberg’s school students are the least
successful in the town. In Dinslaken as a whole 43 percent
of  secondary school students attend a selective academi-
cally focused school, the figure for Lohberg is only 21 per-
cent. Educational failure, rather than success, defines the ex-
pectations of many adolescents there.
Finally, Lohberg also differs from the town as a whole and
other comparable communities in terms of the political atti-
tudes and voting behaviour of its residents. The local results
of the 2017 Bundestag election are illuminating. First of all
turn-out in Lohberg remained at the low level of 2013, about
50 percent (Dinslaken as a whole 74.5 percent) (Kommu-
nales  Rechenzentrum Niederrhein;  www.krzn.de). More sig-
nificant  was  the  successful  participation  of  the  Allianz
Deutscher Demokraten (ADD), which stood for the first time.
The ADD is the German branch of the Turkish governing AKP;
its election posters in Germany feature the portrait of Turkish
President Erdogan. It gained 13 percent and 12 percent of
valid votes respectively in the two voting districts relevant for
Lohberg. If one remembers that fewer than half of Lohberg
residents  have  a  Turkish  migration  background  and  only
those with German citizenship were able to vote, this would
suggest that at least one quarter of persons of Turkish extrac-
tion entitled to vote in Lohberg supported the neo-Ottoman
Islamist ADD.  Considering further that about half of the Lo-
hberg residents of Turkish extraction are not German citizens
and have even closer ties to Turkey it can safely be assumed
that considerably more than one quarter of Lohberg’s “Turks”
support the ADD. They are matched by an equally large seg-
ment  of  autochthonous German voters who prefer  the far-
right anti-Islam policies of the populist AfD. This constellation
is not found in any other part of Dinslaken.
Leaving behind the world of statistics and entering Lohberg
itself, the visitor might be forgiven for seeing the renovated
workers’ houses surrounding the market square as the epit-
ome of the historical mining idyll, steeped in solidarity and
pioneering spirit. While this might appear to be a throw-back
to the supposed golden age of the garden cities movement –
to which Lohberg belongs (Schollmeier 1990) – what we see
here is not the glow of the good old days. 
Even  before  the “guest  worker” migration starting  in  the
1950s, Lohberg was shaped by its local civil society: along-
side the members of the churches principally working class
clubs and societies pursuing interests in sport, singing, mu-
sic, football, pigeon  breeding  etc. These  were people  who
had moved from many different parts of Germany. Interviews
and discussions with older  Lohberg residents suggest  that
the regional differences among the autochthonous German
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population  were  salient  in  daily  life. And  significantly, al-
though nostalgia about working class history and mining tra-
dition might suggest otherwise, the local working class cul-
ture, based around the mine and the clubs, was never some-
thing  symmetrical, cohesive  and homogeneous but  always
characterised by segmentation and hierarchies. 
The  houses  of  the  faceworkers  and  foremen,  who  saw
themselves  as  an  élite,  were  strictly  separate  from  the
houses of the ordinary workers. As reported by long-estab-
lished residents, even in the 1960s the children of the two
status groups were strictly forbidden from playing together,
and  certainly  not  allowed  to  cross  the  status  boundaries
marked by particular streets. The traditional hierarchies that
prevailed underground were also salient above the surface. In
certain respects they still shape the perceptions of older resi-
dents today, for  example when an autochthonous German
former miner describes his relationship to “the Turks” – not
without sarcasm: 
“Equator”
“On the other side of [Lohberger Strasse] – today I always say 
‘across the equator’ there are almost only Turks … our NATO 
partners.”
The status boundaries that segregated housing were also re-
flected in the local organisations and church congregations,
where  leading  positions  were  disproportionately  filled  by
members  of  the  mining  élite. To  this  day, in  2017, social
democratic members of that group insist on an exception to
the party’s  principle  of  geographical  branches. In order  to
avoid the indignity of interacting with lower-status colleagues
they acquired the privilege of organising by profession within
the SPD.
Even before the housing settlement was fully completed,
Lohberg became the scene of a violent historical event. After
the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch of 13 March 1920 in Berlin had
been defeated by a strike movement, radicalised sections of
the  working  class  armed  themselves. Workers  in  Lohberg
were enthused by the strike movement and pursued revolu-
tionary objectives against the Weimar Republic. In the course
of  these  events  Lohberg  became  a  stronghold  of  the  so-
called  “Red Ruhr  Army”, which set  up  an important  com-
mand  post  in  Lohberg  (Litschke  1994,  125–29).  Just  a
month later the workers’ militia was brutally crushed by the
“Freikorps” paramilitaries, which promptly conducted a mass
execution of insurrectionary workers in Lohberg. The events
were subsequently taboo in Lohberg, even within the working
class, and ever since the district has been stigmatised within
Dinslaken  as  rough, violent  and  seditious. Conversely, Lo-
hberg residents regard Dinslaken with great mistrust: to this
day they tend to avoid revealing tensions within their commu-
nity to the town as a whole.
The fact that an ethos of denial or suppression of conflict
has become the bedrock of Lohberg’s local moral order is
not just an after-effect of the collective trauma of the failed
workers’ uprising described above, but is also attributable to
a fundamental peculiarity of mining communities. Mines are
not just businesses like any other. Their directors and man-
agers often see themselves not simply as the boss, but as
the protector  of  their  workforce with special  moral  obliga-
tions. Under an ethos shared with their workforce, the mine
stands for a way of life, a male bond of solidarity uniting life
underground  and  above  into  a  homogeneous  whole. This
masculine ideal of denying or supressing conflict may have
originated  a  desire  to  prevent  accidents, avoid  worsening
mishaps  and  expedite  disaster  response. And  in  order  to
keep  overground conflicts  out  of  the working  process, the
said ideals also characterised life outside of work too. The
ethos of  suppression of  conflict  through male solidarity  is
deeply entrenched in mining, and further reinforced by the
overground functioning of the political labour movement.
This ethos stood in permanent tension to the socio-spatial
separation  of  regional,  national  and  work-related  status
groups, but never in logical contradiction. Under functional
aspects, separation  and solidarity  complemented  one an-
other in the sense that separation of interest groups served
suppression of conflict and successful suppression of con-
flict could in turn serve as evidence of the benefits of male
solidarity.
4. The Lifeworld Boundary Regime
4.1. The Grey Wolf
The lifeworld boundary regime upon which everyday life in
Lohberg is  based is characterised by separation, hierarchy
and segmentation. This came to attention at the very begin-
ning of the field research. In connection with his first inter-
view appointment, where the author had arranged to meet
his interviewee at Lohberg’s central market square, a local
warned him about the youth who hang around there; they
might, the source said, assume his appearance and dress to
identify him as a journalist and harrass him on account of
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their negative experiences with the press. One very illustrative
example of the ins and outs of the boundary regime is the
author’s encounter with a man who regards himself as the
patron of the local Turkish population. The author found him-
self compelled to participate in an incorporation ritual in or-
der to make progress with his field research. The background
to this incident, which will be reconstructed briefly below, is
that the author needed to establish the confidence of two
young  men  of  Turkish  extraction  before  interviewing  them.
One of them, Erkan, was of interest because he was person-
ally acquainted with a number of young men who had left
Lohberg to join the jihad. The other, Kenan, came to attention
as a former member of the emerging jihadist youth scene,
parts of which went on to form the “Lohberg Brigade”. Kenan
himself  had  withdrawn in  the  course  of  the radicalisation
process. 
Weeks before the events described here below the author
had met Erkan and Kenan in two preparatory meetings. But
at this stage, despite the best efforts of a trusted intermedi-
ary, neither could be persuaded to grant the author – hence-
forth referred to as “the field researcher” – an interview. So
the field researcher was rather surprised when weeks later
Erkan conveyed an invitation to meet with a leader of the Lo-
hberg  “Grey  Wolves”, referred  to  here  as  Sedat. Erkan in-
formed the field researcher that Sedat wanted to meet be-
fore deciding whether Kenan and Erkan should give him the
interviews he wanted. The field researcher interpreted this as
a potential breakthrough in what had to date proven largely
fruitless efforts.
Only  later  was  the  field  researcher  to  learn  how  Sedat
came to occupy the role of a patron to these two young men.
In 2013 Sedat played a role in enabling successful negotia-
tions in  Turkey between members  of  the Grey  Wolves  and
members of  the jihadist-Salafist  Jabhat  al-Nusra militia  to
buy the freedom of (at least) three young recruits from Lo-
hberg and bring them back to their parents. The returnees
turned out to be Kenan’s brothers and cousins, so the re-
spect he showed to the “patron” was rooted at least partly in
gratitude. But at the time of the meeting the field researcher
knew nothing of this. After repeated false starts he merely
hoped  this  would  finally  produce  the  breakthrough  he
needed to reconstruct the internal perspective of the neo-
Salafist radicalisation process in Lohberg.
Erkan and Kenan collected the field researcher at the ap-
pointed time and place and drove him to a Turkish tea house
on the edge of a park in the northern part of Duisburg. To the
field  researcher’s  great  surprise  the  two  young  men  now
adopted the formal “Sie” to address him. He wondered what
had led to this switch. Did the pair want to create distance,
in order to grill him more freely later? Anyway, in the car he
apologised meekly for his faux pas. But when he suggested
that he also return to the formal form himself, the pair de-
clined politely but firmly: he was “a doctor” so it was right
that way. The field researcher sensed and feared that this en-
hanced level of formality was preparing him for an encounter
that would be very different from his research contacts to
date. At the same time he comforted himself faintheartedly
that the status accorded by his academic title and perhaps
also his age, meant he could count upon a certain degree of
deference, and perhaps this was what was reflected in the
asymmetry of form of address.
Twenty minutes later they arrived at their destination, met
Sedat and went straight into the pavilion-like café. As far as
the  field  researcher  could  make  out, there  were  no  other
guests on the premises at that time of day, namely early af-
ternoon. The café was divided into a number of lounges to
allow families and groups to meet in semi-public space while
maintaining a degree of privacy and discretion. Sedat led the
little group into one of the lounges. It appeared to the field
researcher that they were entering the backroom of a back-
room. As soon as he had sat down, “Sedat Abe” – as Sedat,
the host, was now addressed by Kenan and Erkan – began
with some formal but friendly smalltalk, but soon turned to
the gist of the matter: the test of trust. When Sedat asked
the  field  researcher  what  his  research  questions  actually
were his tone shifted, he appeared more matter-of-fact and
his basically genial expression became serious. The field re-
searcher answered Sedat’s questions as well as he could,
and could not but notice that Sedat was looking for an ex-
cuse  to  demonstrate  his  inside  knowledge  in  the  field  of
Salafist radicalisation. It appeared to the field researcher as
though Sedat was waiting almost impatiently for an opportu-
nity to underline his own status by presenting his knowledge
and experience. 
In the course of the conversation it became clear that Se-
dat assumed that the supposedly exhaustive information he
supplied would suffice for his guest to conclude his research.
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Meanwhile, frequent  sideward  glances  towards  Erkan  and
Kenan revealed  that  Sedat  was checking  whether  his  two
protégés were suitably impressed. Before Kenan and Erkan
he  wanted  to  appear  as  someone  who  thinks  nothing  of
sparring with an academic. In that he succeeded, as the field
researcher remained rather meek and defensive in order to
avoid confrontation and – hopefully –  earn a degree of trust.
At  some point  the field researcher  asked Sedat  how he
tackled the Salafists in Lohberg. The host began by pointing
out that he knew some of them personally. First  of all, he
said, he researched their background, which was often crimi-
nal. And then exposed their  clandestine financial  interests
and confronted potential recruits with this disillusioning in-
formation. For  example, he  said, he  had  discovered  that
Özkan Turkan, a member of the Lohberg Brigade who he re-
ferred to as the “commandant”, had been involved in drug
dealing  and  other  dubious  business. Phillip  Bergner, who
blew himself up in a suicide car bombing in 2014, had been
nothing but a message boy for the drug dealers. 
This was the point where the field researcher realised that
Sedat perhaps did not possess as much experience with in-
tervention and prevention as he claimed, because Salafists
themselves  make  no  secret  of  past  involvement  with  vio-
lence, drugs and crime. Quite the contrary, these are part of
the neo-Salafist conversion narrative that – like all conversion
narratives  –  describes  a  “road  to  Damascus” experience.
Telling admirers of Saint Paul the Apostle that he was once
the sinner Saul of Tarsus does not reveal biographical contra-
dictions that  might awaken doubts;  it  merely confirms the
message that repentance and conversion can still  put any
delinquent back on the right moral or spiritual track.
Towards the end of the discussion, after about two and a
half hours, Sedat indirectly intimated that he had acquired
his experience of prevention in an unidentified regional Turk-
ish nationalist context. There, he said, he combined the role
of a political leader with the functions of judge and execu-
tioner. To illustrate this he related a story about how he had
threatened and punished a group of pimps in order to save a
young woman from prostitution. The story  began when  he
had been approached by a family whose eighteen-year-old
daughter had disappeared. The family, he said, had tried to
report her as missing to the police but the police had re-
fused on the grounds that she was no longer a minor and
was entitled to choose where to live. He had then found out
where she was living; he had, he said, extracted her from a
brothel. The parents had wanted retribution, so Sedat had ar-
ranged for the pimps to be punished. Of course he had not
participated himself, he said: others had done the job. That
is what he told the police who investigated him: that he had
nothing to say about the matter. In fact, he said, his interven-
tion had significantly improved his reputation with the police,
which had suffered on account of earlier incidents.
When the field researcher asked how he had actually gone
about “rescuing” the young woman, he told how he had en-
tered the brothel in question with a machine-pistol hidden
under his jacket. He could not remember when exactly he
showed the weapon, he said. But when he finally had the
brothel owners sat opposite him, he had taken the magazine
out of the gun. There was one bullet in the barrel and a sec-
ond he placed on the table as a “memento”. Then he had
said: “Give me the girl. If you don’t give me her you’ll have to
shoot me dead here and now or I’ll shoot you all. If you let
her go with me I’ll leave the bullet here on the table and I’ll
leave you in peace.”
Even today, writing this text, the field researcher is uncer-
tain what he should make of the veracity of this story. On the
one hand it appears very clichéed, rather as if Sedat were
retelling an episode from an old mafia film. With frequent
glances to Kenan and Erkan, reading in their faces whether
he was achieving the desired impression, he presented him-
self  as a well-connected and powerful godfather, operating
behind the scenes to right wrongs blamed on supposed po-
lice incompetence. His message: the upright, weak and fallen
can rely on him for protection, especially if they are of Turkish
extraction. He guards them from the dangers, temptations
and intrigues of German society, following the eternal values
of  Turkishness  and  Islam. Sensing  bragging, the  field  re-
searcher doubted that Sedat actually possessed such means
and influence; his claims appeared exaggerated, if not pure
bluff. But in the course of his subsequent field research he
often heard stories from young men concerning inconspicu-
ous  but  successful  vigilante  justice  against  drug  dealers
seeking to operate in Lohberg. And that Sedat, as the field
researcher later learned, had not only been an influential lo-
cal public figure in the far-right MHP but had also been suc-
cessfully prosecuted for offences involving firearms lent the
story a certain degree of credibility after all.
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But let  us return to the incorporation ritual:  Once Sedat
had  finished  telling  his  story  about  rescuing  the  fallen
daughter, he launched into a series of conspiracy theories:
German  politicians  had an interest  in  the  success  of  the
Salafists and the IS, because they wanted to sell them arms;
the supposedly democratic state, organised capital and the
intelligence services were involved in these dubious deals.
While admitting self-critically that all this must sound rather
incredible, he asserted: “Where there’s smoke there’s always
fire.” 
According  to  Sedat  all  these  corruption  processes  and
conspiracies by the political, economic and intelligence es-
tablishment were going on in Lohberg too. He went on to de-
scribe how he had once criticised two local politicians at a
meeting  about  drugs  because  they  had  repeatedly  joked
about drugs and drug consumption and had not taken the
problem seriously enough. He implied that they were profiting
personally from dealing drugs to young people.
Sedat’s conspiracy theories align with many other stories
the field researcher heard from residents describing them-
selves as Muslims. Less educated Lohberg Muslims in partic-
ular told him that the 9/11 attacks in New York had actually
been the work of Mossad and the CIA in order to turn the
world against Islam. Others told that the Pope kept a secret
version of the Bible in the Vatican, whose content was practi-
cally identical to the Quran. If this came to light they said, all
Christians would become Muslims and the Pope would lose
his power.
4.2. Devil or Rabbit?
A conspiracy theory concerning Lohberg itself encapsulates
the depth of the gulf between local Muslims and non-Mus-
lims. According to this story, the supposed urban developers
– who were actually fronting for influential anti-Muslim circles
– had erected a monument to the Devil to provoke and hu-
miliate local Muslims. The narrative relates to a sculpture by
the internationally famous Düsseldorf artist Thomas Schütte
installed in autumn 2014 in the grounds of a new park cre-
ated on reclaimed mining land, the Lohberger Bergpark. The
title of the work is “Rabbit”. But it is quite possible, on ac-
count of its specific form and not least its coat of bright red
high-gloss paint, that one might be reminded of the Lord of
Darkness. But the sculpture’s interpretation as a deliberately
hostile act intended to provoke local Muslims can only be
understood in  the context  of  the lived  everyday  boundary
regime in  Lohberg  and the divisions between Muslim and
non-Muslim.
To understand the degree of alienation between the munic-
ipality and the urban redevelopment agency operating in Lo-
hberg on the one side and the majority of residents of Turkish
extraction on the other, one need only take a glance at the
marketing jargon used by the agency, KQL, to describe the
“Kreativ.Quartier Lohberg” and compare it with the aforemen-
tioned conspiracy narrative:  
A profound statement
In the scope of the art project “Choreography of a Landscape”, 
Schütte has placed a four-metre-tall sculpture in the centre of 
the preserved thickening machine in the park. Schütte’s monu-
mental work “Rabbit” has been given a bright red high-gloss fin-
ish. The sculptural work appears like a “drop sculpture” on the 
central hub of the circular concrete basin – as if pulled out of a 
hat – to introduce the new and unexpected into the location’s 
industrial past. Apparently unrelated to place, time or social 
context, the work nevertheless has something important to say 
about its industrial surroundings and the site’s coal-mining 
past. Responding to the question of where, in view of the heavy
burden of history, a new future can be invented for this place 
and above all its young inhabitants, the sculpture makes a 
statement that is equally light and audacious, challenging and 
playful, current and profound. Its striking form and colour are 
reminiscent of youth culture, scaling to alarming dimensions 
the monstrosity of video game characters. Yet rather like the 
work of a child it succeeds in conjuring the absolutely new into 
this spent space and lending it a new perspective.
(http://www.kreativ.quartier-lohberg.de/de/kunst/kuenstler/
schuette.php, accessed 29 September 2017)
The bizarreness of the contrast between the marketing nar-
rative quoted here and the local conspiracy narrative reflects
the  gap  between  conspiracy  discourse  and  adspeak, be-
tween subjectively experienced humiliation and subjectively
intended enhancement of the “spent space” and finally be-
tween felt  neglect and planned gentrification. Paraphrasing
Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Spirit:  “In  Lohberg’s  distorted
world even the best subjective intentions produce their oppo-
site.”
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Figure 1: The Lohberg “Rabbit” (or Devil?)1
4.3. Symbolic Boundaries
Alongside  malicious  gossip  among  neighbours  and  col-
leagues, conspiracy narratives based on “information” con-
firmed by local figures of repute is perhaps the most impor-
tant form of symbolic boundary-drawing. The conspiracy nar-
rative directs participants’ mistrust towards the West, German
politicians,  the  Christian  religion,  the  municipality  of
Dinslaken and ultimately their autochthonous German neigh-
bours. 
Even social  workers of  Turkish extraction complain about
the rigidity of the local boundary regime and report access
problems no less challenging than those experienced by the
field researcher. Given that background, the fact that the au-
thor did in the end receive the blessing of a plainly influential
local  patron to conduct his interviews should probably  be
seen as the exception from the local rule.
The baseline of the boundary regime is partially defined by
the right-wing extremists of the Grey Wolves,  a fascist move-
ment that played a role in radicalising young people in Ger-
1Source: http://www.kreativ.quartier-lohberg.de/de/kunst/kuen-
stler/schuette.php accessed 5 March 2019
many into jihadism (Marwan Abou-Taam 2016).  Lohberg is a
stronghold of the Grey Wolves, who stage a kind of fair on the
central market square every year. On 22 May 2016 an enthu-
siastic audience crowded round the stage to watch martial
arts choreographies. 
But other population groups and actors also participate in
the production of the local boundary regime. Space permits
only a cursory survey. First of all, the DITIB mosque affects
the local boundary regime. On the one side, it encourages a
kind of inner emigration among its congregation, who tend to
be culturally conservative. Spirituality and nostalgia for the
homeland go hand in hand here. The outcome is a kind of
“transnational umbilical cord” that allows residents of Turkish
extraction to derive succour from national pride and self-es-
teem. The anti-German and anti-Western conspiracy narra-
tives  of  the  Erdogan  government  gain  their  local  foothold
through the same channels. As armour forged from feelings
of superiority they shelter identities injured by experiences of
discrimination and disdain. The observation that the mosque
responds absolutely spontaneously and reflexively to reputa-
tional risks attributable to its members by isolating itself (or
even rejecting its own if this is felt necessary) must probably
be understood in the context of “inner migration” to Erdo-
gan’s Turkey. 
When for  example a  worshipper  told  a  critical  journalist
that fanatical ISIS supporters came and went freely in the
mosque and its football club without encountering criticism
he was systematically  cold-shouldered by members of the
mosque association. In fact photographs of adolescents pos-
ing on the premises of the Lohberg DITIB mosque wearing T-
shirts bearing ISIS propaganda and showing a single, raised
index finger did circulate on social media (the latter being a
gesture popularised by ISIS, supposedly communicating the
absolute monotheism of Sunni Islam and its superiority over
other world religions and other currents of Islam). Publication
of the photographs in mainstream media caused a public
scandal well beyond Dinslaken and led to the resignation of
the mosque committee. But given that the same members
were  re-elected  soon  thereafter, no  learning  process  (still
less critical self-reflection) is discernible, at least outwardly.
In fact the families of the Lohberg jihadists have to deal with
massive rejection and exclusion by the majority of the local
Turkish population. The mosque has never  conducted – or
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even sought to hold – discussions of a pastoral or preventive
nature in Lohberg (as of summer 2016).
On the other side, the football club Rot-Weiß Selimiye Spor
(which was co-founded by the DITIB mosque) fulfils an im-
portant  integrative function. At training children and young
people encounter trainers and other players as role models,
some of whom embody educational and career success out-
side Lohberg and the “ethnic reservation” and thus demon-
strate that the experience of exclusion by the majority society
is not in fact quite as hermetic as might sometimes appear.
Another context of local engagement by the DITIB mosque
also speaks for a fundamental capacity to transcend bound-
aries: it participates in an inter-religious dialogue moderated
by the municipal integration officer, which hosts high-profile
events focussing on the message of religious tolerance.
The discussion about the “equator” and the “NATO part-
ners” demonstrated how everyday boundaries are drawn be-
tween the traditional, autochthonous German working class
and those of Turkish extraction. Although presented in a jovial
manner, this is ultimately a solid symbol of boundary-draw-
ing  and  an indication  of  the  deep  social  divide that  has
opened up in Lohberg, apparently determined by the cosmo-
logical order. Not even German and Turkish membership of
the same military alliance, the phrase implies, can touch the
fundamental irreconcilability  of the cultures that encounter
one another in Lohberg.
A  civil  society  dominated  by  non-immigrants  (au-
tochthonous  Germans)  is  also  involved  in  the  symbolic
boundary-drawing. The discrimination experienced by many
of those of Turkish extraction has already been mentioned. In
interviews and discussions, informants with
a  Turkish  migration  background  named
teachers, business owners, local politicians,
the  aforementioned  urban  developers, es-
tablished  clubs  and  associations,  social
workers  and  the  police  as  the  principal
sources of exclusion and humiliation. In this
connection  they  are  understood  as  repre-
sentatives  of  the  longer-established,  Ger-
man majority society, which is seen as hos-
tile to Islam and to Turkish people. 
If  we avoid focussing too sharply on the
smallest details or tracing every last friction
and conflict, the situation can be portrayed
as follows (Fig. 2):
The symbolic boundaries created by discrimination, mali-
cious gossip and conspiracy theories generate the baseline
of the local boundary regime, which runs between those of
Turkish extraction and the actors of the majority society (the
thick horizontal line). Symbolic boundaries are also observed
between  groups  that  adhere  to  classical  right-nationalist
Turkism and those who follow the Islamist neo-Ottomanism
of the Turkish government (thick broken vertical line). These
groups  all  surreptitiously  circulate  conspiracy  theories  di-
rected  against  each  other. Their  influence  and  ideological
contradictions are particularly  pointed because – unlike in
other comparable communities – Lohberg’s Turkish popula-
tion  possesses  neither  meaningful  democratic, integration-
oriented organisations nor prominent individuals capable of
challenging the predominant siege mentality.
There is also a developing contradiction between one part
of the local civil society that is composed largely of non-mi-
grants with a positive attitude towards migration-related di-
versity and the local autochthonous German working class
population. Until the final phase of the fieldwork the culture
of conflict suppression kept this opposition largely concealed
(in the graphic the thin vertical line). As described above, it
was the local results of the 2017 Bundestag election that re-
vealed this aspect.
5. Combative Everyday Culture, Warrior Ethos and 
Spiritual Salvation
An aggressive, macho everyday culture corresponding in part
to industrial  proletarian traditions and in part  to imported
Figure 2: Basic outlines of the everyday boundary regime in Lohberg
1. Migrants of Turkish extraction A
Grey Wolves and an associated mi-
lieu of informal groups of young men
2. Migrants of Turkish extraction B
DITIB-mosque and its milieu
3. Autochthonous German working 
class milieu and other non-Muslim 
residents
4. Autochthonous German civil society
(churches, clubs and associated, 
prominent local figures, local political 
parties, school, pharmacy, local art 
and culture scene, urban redevelopers 
[gentrifiers], local representatives of 
municipality and voluntary-sector or-
ganizations)
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lifeworld structures was already established in Lohberg long
before  the  emergence  of  a  jihad-seeking  group  of  young
men.  A talented fighter trained in the martial arts for exam-
ple will command correspondingly high standing. 
Normality of violence and respect
“And you said you were well liked?”
“Yeah, because dad is and [incomprehensible] grandpa (…) 
they were miners, hard-working people. Went to every wedding, 
like.”
“Your father then?”
“And grandpa. See they were really well-known in Lohberg. And 
dad and grandpa they were real fighters. Real proper like. If 
somebody stepped out of line, they’d show him. (…) Everyone 
invited him, weddings, any kind of party, celebration. Went 
didn’t they. If I got married now you can bet at least fifteen hun-
dred people would come.”
(Interview with a third-generation migrant of Turkish extraction )
According to the accounts  of  interviewees, teachers  and
social  workers, physical  violence is  most  prevalent  against
young men from other parts of Dinslaken or elsewhere who
seek the romantic attention of the sister or cousin of a local
young man. According to interviewees violent vigilante justice
is also exercised in the form of assault and robbery against
suspected drug dealers. In view of these facts, it  is rather
surprising that the extent of public violence recorded in the
police crime statistics  is  no higher  than in  other  parts of
Dinslaken. This could however be attributable to inadequa-
cies of the statistics (Müller 2000; Haug et al. 2008, 6ff.).
For clarity about the local culture of violence we must look
not to the police statistics on crimes of violence, but instead
examine a trait of the local culture that distinguishes every-
day life  in  Lohberg  from that  in  other  parts  of  Dinslaken.
What could be called a “righteous warrior  narrative” circu-
lates in Lohberg above all among young people of Turkish ex-
traction. Young men in particular subscribe with great enthu-
siasm to  the ethos it  transports:  the warrior  who resolves
conflicts using legitimate and spiritually justified force. The
effect of this narrative arises simply through its mere exis-
tence, and not through a concentration of publicly visible or
recorded incidents of violence. The specific about this narra-
tive is that it propagates a way of life that melds the spiritual
search for meaning with the fighting career of the warrior to
create an ethical and metaphysical life model. The spirituality
here is not drawn solely from Islam. Equally important are
the  Turkish  mythology  cultivated  by  members  of  the  Grey
Wolves and – above all among male adolescents – great ad-
miration for the spiritually-oriented Asian martial arts. In Loh-
berg militant Neo-Salafism was able to lock seamlessly into
the  amalgam  of  ideas  observed  among  the  male  youth:
search for spiritual salvation, warrior ethos and sense of jus-
tice. It  is  a precept  of  combative male culture that young
men inspired in this fashion – even in the event of victimisa-
tion – do not turn to the police and courts and consequently
remain absent from the police crime statistics.
Among  many  interviewees  of  Turkish  extraction,  classic
Asian martial arts films form a source of inspiration for meld-
ing  the  search  for  spiritual  salvation  with  the  warrior’s
process of enlightenment through direct experience of fight-
ing. Some interviewees described their encounter with films
of this genre (for example Bruce Lee films) and their protago-
nists as an almost religious experience. The protagonists are
more than just movie heroes for many young men in Lohberg.
Let us consider Bruce Lee: In terms the martial arts world
Bruce  Lee  stands  for  the  Wing  Chun  variant  of  Kung  Fu,
which is in turn an element  of  Mixed Martial  Arts (MMA).
MMA is very popular in Lohberg. During his field research the
author saw many cars displaying images, posters and other
symbols  advertising  or  otherwise  relating  to  this  extreme
sport. His own participant  observations – over  a period of
one year – of martial arts training in a local club specialising
in MMA confirm that at least the fitness training attracts very
large numbers of children and adolescents along with their
parents. Some training sessions were attended by more than
one hundred persons of all ages. As adolescent interviewees
confirm, an interest in Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan and martial
arts or Samurai films is enough to generate enthusiasm for
the synthesis of fighting and spirituality. 
Indeed, syntheses of warrior ethos and spiritual enlighten-
ment are not as outlandish as might at first glance appear.
For example the striving for self-improvement propagated in
the Samurai code of honour, the bushid  (the way of warō -
riors), recalls forms of mystic asceticism. In the ideas of the
Samurai too, the warrior’s search for perfection and justice is
never only a conflict with an external enemy, but equally or
even more so a  struggle  with  the  inner  foe, the  personal
weaknesses and diverse temptations that may lead the indi-
vidual  to  violate  the  code  of  honour.  The  same  applies
equally  to  Kung  Fu,  which  was  developed  in  a  Chinese
monastery. Both in the world of fighting and in the mystic
current in Islam (which is incidentally present in Lohberg in
the guise of a mosque of the Süleymancılar movement), a
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deeply  hierarchical  understanding  of  honour  (achieved
through the individual’s progression on a path of enlighten-
ment) and the fear of losing both status and face a central
role (Hüttermann 2002). Especially because the search for
spiritual salvation and the warrior ethos embedded in Asian
philosophy and concepts of honour are closer than sociolo-
gists, theologians and Islam experts would like to believe,
gangsta rap stars like Bushido and Deso Dogg were able to
juggle, aestheticize and instrumentalise elements from both
worlds (Deso Dogg actually  joined the al-Nusra Front  and
has since been declared dead several times). Their example
also demonstrates that alongside apologetic films and litera-
ture, popular music’s aestheticisation of violence is also ca-
pable  of  paving the way for  a  fusing  of  the Asian warrior
ethos with the promise of  salvation. Given that  this aligns
with the tastes of the generally young recipients the author
encountered in Lohberg, this can create an individual psy-
chological configuration upon which the neo-Salafist radicali-
sation must merely piggyback in order to be successful. 
6. The Mining Effect, Fraternal Sociability and 
Speechlessness
Thus far six elements have been identified as having poten-
tially  expedited  the formation  of  a  group of  militant  Neo-
Salafist Jihadists: 
1. A historically  rooted and locally  reinforced moral  order
consisting of an ethos of suppression of conflict through
male solidarity and 
2. a self-perception as outsiders. 
3. Discrimination experienced by young people who are per-
ceived as Turkish. 
4. Globalisation  in  the  sense  that  11  September  2001
dragged almost everyone into the vortex of a supposedly
inescapable  “clash of  civilisations”, along  with  the dis-
semination of new culturalistic theories of group inferiority.
Globalisation has even reached Lohberg, not least with
the successes of Erdogan, the Islamic State and global
right-wing  populism, and  their  respective  repercussions
among Turkish Muslims living there.
5. A rift between established and migrant whose roots derive
from mining history, deepened by symbolic  boundaries,
conspiracy theories and culturalistic theories. And
6. A combative everyday culture, which is not untypical for
traditional proletarian communities, but was reinvigorated
in the 1960s and 1970s through traditions imported by
chain migration (from Songuldak and Samsun). In its cur-
rent development stage, achieved well before the appear-
ance of the Lohberg Brigade, this combative everyday cul-
ture creates – not least through the influence of the Grey
Wolves  and pop/counterculture  aestheticisiation  of  vio-
lence – a macho synthesis of warrior ethos and spiritual
salvation that promises young men self-improvement and
gender honour.
To  round off  the picture, mention  must  be made of  (at
least)  three  elements  that  are  part  of  the  spatial  milieu:
These would be (a) the “mining effect”; (b) the fraternal style
of sociability; and (c) the phenomenon of speechlessness. 
a) The concept of the “mining effect” introduces the closure
of the coal mine in 2005, and connects this with a psycho-
logical mechanism currently being (re)discovered by research
into neo-Salafist radicalisation. The latter is the observation
that the (subjectively) traumatic loss or absence of the father
apparently  motivated some young jihadists  in  Germany  to
search intuitively for a substitute father figure. The absent or
lost father reappears in the guise of an attentive and charis-
matic male leader figure – and/or a divine and omniscient
metaphysical “father” (see for example Mansour 2015; criti-
cal  Logvinov  2017). As  yet  unpublished biographical  case
studies conducted by the Institut  für  interdisziplinäre Kon-
flikt- und Gewaltforschung confirm that this social-psycholog-
ical mechanism can play a role in neo-Salafist radicalisation.
When  analysing  court  documents  and  biographical  inter-
views with convicted neo-Salafists, Viktoria Roth, Nils Böckler
and Fabian Srowig noticed that a significant number of cases
were characterised by the loss of the father by death, illness
or divorce. This was apparently processed biographically in
the radicalisation process. Precisely this probably also ap-
plies to some of the young men who later came to form the
“Lohberg Brigade”. Other members of the group were also af-
fected by the father’s loss of employment (and face), and bi-
ographically influenced through the implosion of the father/
provider role (withdrawal of father to local tea houses, addic-
tion issues etc.).
I would argue that the pit closure (in 2005) bears a share
of responsibility for this development. The closure meant the
loss of the most important local workplace. Successive gen-
erations of workers had been able to rely on mining in Lo-
hberg, whose significance to those who worked there, as out-
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lined above, meant a great deal more than merely a job. Min-
ing was never just as a business, but always also a way of
life: brotherhood, male preserve, extended family and guar-
antor of the continuation of a patriarchal, hierarchical system
of male dominance. Although this system did not collapse in
a day, many migrant families relied on it until the pit closed
and showed little interest in the labour market outside Lo-
hberg. Many Lohberg residents with a migration background
lost their jobs and above all a section of the men lost the re-
spect hitherto shown them by their children, the type of re-
spect that derives from the provider role. Teachers and youth
workers reported that the respect shown by school students
of Turkish extraction to their fathers collapsed during this pe-
riod. One teacher complained that from this point he was no
longer able to threaten that he would inform their father if
they were poorly behaved or lazy. In one case the response
was “You’ll have to find him first!”
In  a nutshell:  The painfully  protracted pit  closure in  Lo-
hberg represented the crisis of a conservative way of life cul-
tivated especially by the descendants of the “guest workers”
from Samsun and Songuldak, which had long harmonised
perfectly with the traditional ethos of a mining community.
While many of the women continue to keep the household,
some of the men felt they had been stripped of their gender
honour. The resulting crisis of the family led in turn to a bio-
graphical  crisis of the adolescent males. This is where the
neo-Salafist radicalisation offered a quick fix. 
The context described here, which the author would call the
mining effect, is not deterministic. If it were, the so-called Lo-
hberg Brigade would have had many more members than the
twenty who joined it. Functional alternatives for resolving bio-
graphical crises do exist; the fusion of spiritual salvation and
warrior  ethos  in  neo-Salafism  is  not  the  only  avenue  to
recognition and success. Such successes presuppose con-
tact to other role models in sport  or work, which naturally
also exist in Lohberg.
b) The pronounced fraternal style of sociability in Lohberg
represents another element whose effect is amplified in in-
teraction with the elemets already listed. A style of sociability
has emerged in Lohberg’s migrant population (and to some
extent beyond) that combines the local proletarian traditions
of socialising in the workplace, in (sports) clubs, in the trade
union or in the public house with traditional forms of local
and family socialising. One could say that a local style of fra-
ternal sociability has emerged in Lohberg. The points of con-
tact for the fusion of the mining style of sociability with the
conservative style of the migrants of  Turkish extraction are
the following commonalities: Firstly the male dominance in-
herent  to  both  traditions, second  the  ideal  of  the  family
(where miners see themselves as a big family), thirdly the
ideal of conflict supression and fourthly a sense of trust con-
ditioned  by  spatial  proximity. All  these  commonalities  are
here subsumed under the term fraternality and as such enter
into the concept  of  the “fraternal  style  of  sociability”. The
term  “style  of  sociability”  originates  with  Michael  Vester
(1997, 188f.), who used it to describe the modernised so-
cial structure of German society and its macro-group milieus.
In the context of interest here style of sociability refers simply
to the patterns of making and maintaining contacts within a
community.
Almost all the spontaneous accounts in the narrative-bio-
graphical interviews with Lohberg residents begin in the ex-
pansive back courts of the housing blocks. Here the male
children and adolescents in particular form cliques that con-
tinue to exist through school and on into apprenticeship and
sports clubs (football or martial arts). Here in sight of mother
or father or an older sibling is where at least the boys spent
most of their  childhood. Neighbours who grew up together
draw on the local social capital accumulated in the process
of primary and secondary socialisation for as long as possi-
ble. Extended family and neighbourly ties between parents
and grandparents amplify this form of sociability;  they are
not decisive for fraternal sociability, but always act in unison
with the familiarity engendered by spatial proximity – at the
same time externalise mistrust. The male children and ado-
lescents connect and bond through jointly shared time and
jointly shared space in a manner that is formative. So it is
usual to join a club (for example football or martial arts) as
an entire clique rather than individually, and to change club
in groups rather than individually too. The same pattern is
found in the choice of secondary school, in the formation of
groups within  school  classes  and on the  playground, and
also for attending clubs outside Lohberg. While these forms
of expression of fraternal sociability may not be terribly Lo-
hberg-specific, others are all the more so. Thus the adoles-
cent “fraternities”, as mentioned above, frequently become
entangled in conflicts and violence to “defend the honour” of
a “brother’s” sister or cousin who has been (accused of) flirt-
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ing with a boy or man from a different quarter or town. The
observation of an older teacher who had taught pupils from
Lohberg for many decades is revealing. He remembers when
he  started  teaching  the  male  pupils  from  Lohberg  called
each other  “Kumpel” (“mate”, originally  a fellow miner)  or
“Kollege”  (colleague)  and  a  generation  later  “Bruder”
(brother) or “Alter” (“old one”). In recent years, he said, stu-
dents had taken to calling each other “Akhi” , the Arabic for
“brother”. It is no coincidence that “akhi” is one of the most
common forms of address in contexts of neo-Salafist radical-
isation. With respect to five of her students who left Lohberg
to  join  the  “jihad”,  Lamya  Kaddor  observed  in  2014:
“Salafism has become a youth movement” (Lamya Kaddor,
interview, DerWesten – Online-News-Portal der Funke Medi-
engruppe, 13 October 2014).  The linguistic shift described
above confirms this observation.
c) In the course of his field research the author gained the
impression  of  a  pronounced  speechlessness  especially
among males of Turkish extraction in Lohberg. This was espe-
cially  obvious  in  connection  with  topics  touching  on  the
moral field of guilt and shame. Two examples: 
1. There are still parents whose children joined the civil war
living in Lohberg. Some of the children are dead, some are in
prison, others again are still in the warzone. Yet at the time
when I conducted my interviews in spring 2016 the DITIB
mosque had not even tried to seek a discussion with these
families. It was much more concerned to distance itself from
the jihadists by denying that they were real Muslims. 
2. One young man had taken into his home two of his (bio-
logical) brothers who had joined the Salafist al-Nusra Front
in Syria. He had had to spend all his savings and sell his
business to buy their freedom, and that of a cousin. In an in-
terview he related how his brothers often woke up screaming
from nightmares. At that point (after two years) he still did
not feel able to ask them why they left to join the jihad, still
less to tell him what they experienced there. His problem was
that he was afraid he would not be able to control himself in
such a situation, and would do violent harm to his brothers.
He feared this would tear the family apart.
What all these examples share is that it is impossible to
imagine conflicts being conducted in a way that is advanta-
geous for both sides, still less ultimately healing. Indeed in
the course of  his  field  research the author  observed that
conflicts  are  not  conducted symmetrically  and discursively
but often more in the form of a “talking to” that a higher-sta-
tus  older  brother, friend, associate  or  family  member  ad-
dresses to (or rather inflicts upon) his lower-status brothers,
friends or colleagues, while the recipient defers in the mo-
ment. If status were equal this form of moralising, accusatory
lecture would lead to conflict escalation. 
Those  who  are  tempted  to  spout  quasi-academic  half-
knowledge about the supposed essential nature of Islam as
a “warrior religion” (Max Weber) in order to “explain” the in-
ability  to resolve conflicts constructively should first  pause
and ask themselves what role the proletarian and mining tra-
dition of supression of conflict might be playing.
7. Discussion
Many years before neo-Salafists appeared in Lohberg, peo-
ple of Turkish extraction had been experiencing discrimina-
tion everywhere in Germany, and Dinslaken-Lohberg was nat-
urally no exception. Long before a number of Lohberg resi-
dents turned into jihadists, the crystallising event of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 had cemented the narrative of a violent clash
of civilisations, with more or less half-baked theories about
superiority and the irreconcilability of Western and Oriental
cultures  brought  into  circulation  –  also  in  Lohberg. Many
years before a neo-Salafist preacher like Pierre Vogel spoke
in 2006 on the premises of the DITIB mosque, Lohberg had
already acquired an outsider status and a visible and experi-
enceable divide in everyday life had opened up between the
established and migrants of  Turkish extraction. Building on
the entrenched hierarchy of the local mining community and
drawing in particular on mutual conspiracy theories and life-
world theories asserting inferiority of Muslims and non-Mus-
lims, Turks and Germany, the local DITIB mosque, the Grey
Wolves but  also  local  societal  actors  and the established
civil society have contributed to this development. Long be-
fore these events, the working class ideal of conflict supres-
sion inherent to mining tradition and the labour movement
had shaped the moral order in the quarter and the town and
established a culture of looking away that is still felt today.
Long  before  these  events  a  combative  everyday  culture,
which was already characteristic for many traditional prole-
tarian communities, had consolidated in Lohberg. It was rein-
vigorated in  the 1960s and 1970s through traditions im-
ported by chain migration (from Songuldak and Samsun). In
its current development stage, achieved well before the ap-
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pearance of  the Lohberg Brigade, this combative  everyday
culture offers young men in particular a macho synthesis of
spiritual  salvation with  warrior  ethos. Long before Lohberg
residents departed in small groups for ISIS territory, the fra-
ternal  style  of  sociability  was locally  entrenched, and ulti-
mately influenced their departure. Probably also established
long before the events in question, the everyday culture of
speechlessness, which was able to build both on the mining
and labour  movement  culture  of  supression of  conflict  as
well  as  for  example  the  traditional  Islamic  prohibition  on
strife  (fitna)  among  fellow  believers  cultivated  by  DITIB
among others. And then the years preceding the departure of
the jihadists saw the – eminently foreseeable – pit closure
mark the demise of a local institutional space that offered
the infrastructural and economic preconditions for residents
of  Turkish  extraction  in  particular  (but  also  autochthonous
Germans) to  be able  to  live  in  Lohberg as if  in  a closed
“guest-worker  reservation”. The break  in  the group biogra-
phies – of autochthonous Germans but above all of migrants
of Turkish extraction – associated with the pit closure contrib-
uted materially  and developmentally  to  young  men in  Lo-
hberg developing a special susceptibility to the radical call of
Neo-Salafism.
The list of socio-spatial elements (to some extent acting on
the community from outside but acquiring their consequence
through it) might lead the reader to wonder why more Lo-
hberg residents were not captivated by jihadism. If one imag-
ines that the fraternal style of sociability predominant among
young males engenders widespread mistrust against every-
thing from outside, and this mistrust is directed against the
German society  by AKP offshoots and Grey Wolves, and if
one also  remembers that  the ensuing  countercultural  atti-
tudes are amplified by the aestheticisation, moralisation and
sanctification of violence, and if  one finally also factors in
the strengthening  aspects  mentioned here, then a  picture
emerges of an almost perfect self-referential  closed social
feedback mechanism that one might surmise could only pro-
duce jihadists en masse. If that has not been the case the
reason lies in other modernising, compensating and inter-
vening elements that the author had to set to one side here
in the interests of distilling the quasi “pure model” of socio-
spatial radicalisation in Lohberg. 
What  was  found  was  that  the  jihadist  radicalisation  in
Dinslaken-Lohberg was able to build on the socio-spatial mi-
lieu and its respective elements. Each considered on its own
may appear insignificant, but in interference they comprise
the socio-spatial  socio-logic that  contributed to the emer-
gence of the Lohberg Brigade. These preconditions of radical-
isation not  only complement  each other, they amplify one
another. Thus for example experiences of discrimination are
not simply supplemented by conspiracy theories; they grant
conspiracy theories an aura of credibility  that  they cannot
achieve on their own. Explaining space-related radicalisation
processes means more than adding up spatial factors with
multiple causes to identify a fixed effect. Where every single
element contributes to strengthening each other element, all
elements  together  constitute  an  emergence-promoting  mi-
lieu. What emerges then feeds back to the persistence of all
elements of this milieu, in a form where the ensemble of ele-
ments in turn contributes to the persistence of the emerged
phenomenon.
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